Commentary: Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments by Ring, Diane M.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-1995
Commentary: Fixing Realization Accounting:
Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the
Taxation of Financial Instruments
Diane M. Ring
Boston College Law School, diane.ring@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Diane M. Ring. "Commentary: Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial
Instruments." Tax Law Review 50, no.4 (1995): 797-802.
HeinOnline -- 50 Tax L. Rev. 797 1994-1995
Commentary 
DIANERING* 
David Bradford's article explores the nature of tax arbitrage exem-
plified by the use of financial instruments.1 To identify rules that 
would eliminate arbitrage opportunities, Professor Bradford seeks to 
specify what properties such a rule must possess. He focuses on the 
distinction between arbitrage opportunities presented by time and 
those presented by risk, and concludes that a successful rule must 
eliminate both.2 Consistency is necessary to eliminate timing arbi-
trage and a preset rate is necessary to eliminate risk arbitrage. 
In reaching this determination, Professor Bradford observes that 
the difficulties for rulemaking posed by timing arbitrage are more 
challenging than perhaps has been fully appreciated.3 To the e:..."tent 
that this is true (and that critiques of the tax system have concentrated 
more on risk arbitrage), it may be linked to the distinction in the cur-
rent system between fixed and contingent returns. Although this rela-
tionship does not mirror the time vs. risk contrast directly (for 
example, Professor Bradford's case of long-term bonds, which may be 
fixed but not riskless), there is some similarity. In the conte:..."t of the 
realization system, "less risky" investments, those with fixed returns, 
have lent themselves more readily to some form of accrual taxation-
the classic example being the treatment of original issue discount 
(OID) bonds.4 Although such a rule does not eliminate timing arbi-
trage, it comes closer to economic income than realization's wait-and-
see method, and, with the "assistance" of transaction costs, it may re-
duce arbitrage effectively. In contrast, "more risky" investments, 
those with contingent returns, typically have faced a realization-based 
wait-and-see rule, refiecting a judgment that issues of administrability 
and legitimacy can make it difficult to tax such gains and losses before 
they have been determined.s From the perspective of the existing re-
alization system, it is the contingent returns (that is, the "more risk.]''' 
* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. 
1 David F. Bradford, FIXing Realization Accounting: Symmetry. Consistency and Cor-
rectness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments. 50 Tax L. Rev. 731 (1995). 
2 Id. at 738. 
3 Id. at 743-57. 
4 See IRe §§ 1272-1275. . 
5 Of course, prerealization taxation has been implemented with limited application. for 
example, the mark-ta-market regime of § 1256. 
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investments), whose current taxation is perhaps farthest from eco-
nomic income, that appear to pose a barrier to more "arbitrage-proof" 
rules. 
Regardless of why the literature may have focused on risk, the goal 
is to ascertain the origins of both risk and timing arbitrage and iden-
tify the keys to eliminating them. Of the four proffered methods for 
preventing arbitrage, two provide Professor Bradford with the desired 
result of eliminating arbitrage potential in a transaction involving both 
risk and time: the mark-to-market rule and the Auerbach retrospec-
tive allocation rule.6 Because Professor Bradford considers a univer-
sal mark-to-market regime unlikely, he focuses on the Auerbach 
method, the only one of the four that is both "successful" and incorpo-
rates a realization mechanism.7 Professor Bradford then considers 
whether other methods (beyond the four) are available. He proposes 
a broad rule using a gain recognition date (GRD) and a gain tax rate 
(GTR), along with imputation of interest to basis and interest charges 
on deferred tax payments, to satisfy the conditions of consistency and 
preset rates.8 The broader proposed rule is not in addition to the 
Auerbach method; rather, the latter is described as a particular ver-
sion of the proposed rule where the GRD and the GTR are zero, leav-
ing only imputation of interest to an imputed basis.9 
In understanding the results of Professor Bradford's analysis, it may 
be helpful to observe that the arbitrage issue (both risk and timing) 
ultimately returns to the question of the effective tax rate for gain and 
loss. If a taxpayer faces different effective tax rates for gain and loss, 
arbitrage is possible. In the case of risk-free transactions in a single 
tax rate world, symmetry eliminates timing arbitrage by preventing a 
taxpayer from holding both sides of a single transaction,10 which, in 
the absence of symmetry, might have different timing rules for inclu-
sions and deductions. Such an asymmetric scenario (for example, im-
mediate deductions and deferred income) would effectively subject 
the taxpayer to two different tax rates in an economically net zero 
transaction, thereby presenting a timing arbitrage opportunity. In a 
multi-tax rate world, where the market cannot successfully eliminate 
arbitrage opportunities between economically equivalent instruments 
facing different tax rules, consistency (which includes the lesser stan-
6 Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 167 
(1991). 
7 Bradford, note 1, at 769. 
8 Id. at 770-72. 
9 Id. at 776. 
10 TIming or arbitrage between two different transactions that are economically 
equivalent but are subject to different tax rules is eliminated by the market in a single tax 
rate world. 
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dard of symmetry) is necessary to eliminate the timing arbitrage. Ab-
sent a requirement of consistency, a taxpayer could take a gain 
position on an instrument subject to one tax regime and a loss position 
on one subject to another so that, although the tID.payer faced a par-
ticular tax rate in both cases, the timing (immediate deduction, de-
ferred income) would create different effective tax rates. 
Fmally, with the inclusion of risk in the picture, both consistency 
and a preset rate become necessary. As noted above, consistency 
serves to prevent different effective tax rates on the gain and loss sides 
of two economically equivalent transactions. Requiring a preset rate 
achieves a related goal, eliminating the possibility of different effective 
rates for gain and loss due to a strategy of cherrypicking with a single 
type of transaction (risk arbitrage). Thus, in one sense, elimination of 
the two kinds of arbitrage can be seen as simply requiring a mecha-
nism that ensures that gain and loss are taxed at the same effective 
rates. For the purpose of evaluating and designing rules, however, it is 
necessary to think more precisely, as Professor Bradford has done, 
about the operation of the two kinds of arbitrage and the separate 
ways in which. they arise. 
Nevertheless, the centrality to both arbitrage mechanisms of differ-
ent effective tax rates on gain and loss offers another way to see Pro-
fessor Bradford's proposal: as providing a single effective rate within 
a transaction (the risk problem) through the GTR and the GRD, and 
providing a single effective rate across transactions (the intertemporal 
problem) through imputation of interest to basis and interest charges 
on deferred tax payments. Moreover, this restatement of the issue 
highlights part of the difference between risk and timing arbitrage that 
may cause the latter to be a greater challenge to rule drafting. To the 
extent risk raises concerns regarding different effective rates for a 
given instrument (cherrypicking), and timing raises concerns regard-
ing different effective rates between economically equivalent instru-
ments (for example, Professor Bradford's comparison of single unit 
bonds v. OID bonds under old tax rules), the latter may be inherently 
a more complicated question to resolve-hence his observations on 
the difficulty of eliminating timing arbitrage. 
Professor Bradford's article, although primarily analytical, seeks 
more than an idealized answer to the arbitrage problem. It aims at 
improving the current system, a task that is ultimately one of adminis-
tration and policy. The question is how to use the improved under-
standing of tax arbitrage to make changes. The government needs to 
consider ways in which to connect fundamental observations to realis-
tic tax policy. A first step could be to pursue a question raised at the 
outset of Professor Bradford's article: What is the actual role of trans-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 50 Tax L. Rev. 800 1994-1995
800 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50: 
action costs in limiting tax arbitrage? Are transaction costs declining? 
Should one anticipate that the developing financial technology essen-
tially will eliminate such costs? Some exploration of this general ques-
tion already has been undertaken,11 and the answers may say 
something about how to evaluate the costs and benefits of moving to 
an alternative system. To make such an assessment, the government 
also must identify the costs of moving to Professor Bradford's pro-
posed rule, including the administrative and informational concerns 
that might arise. 
One immediate change required would be the removal of special 
rules for capital gain and loss. Certainly, the capital gains preference12 
is incompatible with the elimination of arbitrage. Also, other special 
rules must be evaluated for their arbitrage potential, including the 
treatment of tax-exempt participants13 and the step-up of basis on 
death.14 Depending on the scope of the proposed rule, arbitrage op-
portunities might develop between those transactions that were sub-
ject to the proposed rule and those that were not. Given that the 
proposal likely would be implemented on a limited basis initially, per-
haps restricted to financial instruments, this concern may be particu-
larly important. The exact nature of the potential problem depends in 
large part on where the dividing line is drawn and how it is described. 
If the definition of financial instruments is fairly expansive (thUS in-
cluding within its scope the majority of transactions likely to be paired 
strategically with each other), and the Service is granted significant 
discretion, as an anti-abuse measure, to classify a transaction as sub-
ject to the proposal, then, in theory, much arbitrage potential may be 
eliminated. However, the demonstrated ability of sophisticated plan-
ners to develop techniques to achieve their goals, combined with the 
difficulty of the Service's task of policing the boundary, calls for a 
measure of skepticism and caution about eliminating arbitrage if the 
proposal is pursued with limited scope. 
Other direct implementation questions also arise. To the extent the 
GTR is beyond the taxpayer's control (because it is set by the govern-
ment or determined by formula), would there be pressure on setting 
the acquisition date? That is, would taxpayers have a strong incentive 
to manipulate the date identified as the acquisition date, after they 
obtained more information on the value of their positions? This 
might not be a problem, even if taxpayers had such an incentive, if it 
11 See Mark P. Gergen, The Effect of Price Volatility and Strategic 'frading Under Reali-
zation, Expected Return and Retrospective Taxation, 49 Tax L. Rev. 209 (1994). 
12 IRC § l(h). 
13 See, e.g., §§ 401(a), 501(a) (exempting pension plans from tax), §§ 501(a),(c) (ex-
empting charitable organizations from tax). 
14 IRC § 1014. 
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were generally difficult to manipulate the acquisition date. If, how-
ever, such manipulation were feasible or demanded significant gov-
ernment resources to uncover, some safeguard might be necessary. 
One possibility is the use of a same day identification rule, similar to 
the rules used for hedges.15 Unfortunately, the premise underlying 
such a rule may be false in this case. Typically, same day identification 
rules presume that the acquisition date is clear; the identification re-
quirement simply forces the taxpayer to elect hedging treatment on 
that day, rather than later, when more information on the contract 
value is available. If, however, the acquisition date is the source of 
debate, the premise fails and the rule is not a serious barrier to 
manipulation. 
Another possibility is the development of a joint buyer/seller identi-
fication rule, with the expectation that the two parties would have op-
posite incentives with regard to setting the acquisition date. 
Unfortunately, if one party has more to gain from adjusting the date 
than the other has to lose, an adjustment could be made and the net 
benefit shared. Ultimately, it may be more appropriate to view an 
acquisition date problem as a case of fraud, rather than as an example 
of legal, strategic planning. 
The use of the GTR also raises questions. Would effective applica-
tion of this proposal make it necessary to record the appropriate GTR 
for each instrument because it would vary? Would each asset require 
its own schedule in the event of different GTRs, so that offsetting of 
gains and losses did not occur prior to application of the GTR? For 
example, if taxpayer acquires asset A in Year 1, asset B in Year 2, 
asset C in Year 3, and sells all three assets in Year 5, the GTR for each 
asset might be different from each other (either because the baseline 
for calculating it, for example, taxpayer's prior year marginal rate, 
changed, or because it was set by the government and, as frequently 
happens, Congress changed the rates) and different from any other 
tax rate generally applicable to the taxpayer that year. Similar ques-
tions apply to the selection of the interest rate for imputation to basis. 
If the true period interest rate could be identified, how and when 
would one be determined? If it were a rate selected by the govern-
ment (and thus would be likely to vary over time), what arbitrage op-
portunities might exist? 
Unfortunately, the vagaries of policy implementation, the con-
straints of administration, and the almost certain likelihood of con-
stant changes to the tax system make it difficult to move easily from 
theory to execution. This problem may be exacerbated when the pro-
posal under consideration seeks to eliminate arbitrage, which, by its 
15 Reg. § 1.1221-2. 
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very nature, thrives on changes and inconsistencies in the tax system. 
Hopefully, an increasing understanding of timing and risk arbitrage 
will facilitate the development of rules that can be implemented prac-
tically with as close an approximation of the desired goal as possible. 
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